This is my first time writing paper in English. It is a heavy work, for HIST 1150.
Introduction
1941 July 24, Japan occupied French Indo-china from Vichy France. The excuse of occupation was to cut off the supply line from South-east Asia to Chungking. U.S., Britain and Dutch government in exile was nervous about the purpose of Japan. After that, U.S, Britain and Dutch announced to suspend the supply of petroleum and steel to Japan. On the morning of 8th December, Japanese Combined Fleet started to attack U.S Navy in Pearl Harbor. During these months, How did Churchill and Roosevelt prepare for a war? Or, they ever saw a war coming? I try to find them out through the correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt.
July 26
Roosevelt to Churchill [via Navy Channels]
“Tell former Naval Person(Churchill) our concurrent action in regard to Japan is, I think, bearing fruit. I hear their Government much upset and no conclusive future policy has been determined on. Tell him also in great confidence that I have suggested to Nomura that Indo-China be neutralized by Britain, Dutch, Chinese and ourselves …I have had no answer yet. When it comes it will probably be unfavorable but we will have at least made one more effort to avoid Japanese expansion to South Pacific. ”
After negotiations with the Vichy Government, Japan was given permission to place elements of its army in French Indochina in July 1941. U.S, Britain and Dutch were worried about the expansion of Japan in South-east Asia threatening their safety. At the moment, Roosevelt wanted to neutralize Indo-china to prevent the further expansion of Japan. Japan thought that Germany was successful in the war against Russia, therefore, Germany and Japan together could deter the United States from going to war. At the same day, he froze all Japanese assets in United States. Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies government did likewise. Roosevelt also placed an embargo on oil exports to Japan. 88 per cent of oil consumption in Japan was imported. After the embargo, her oil stock was just sufficient for 1.5 years. However, a survey conduct by Japanese War Office had shown that a victory in China need three years more.
Roosevelt’s attitude was obviously not expecting a war coming. Negotiation with Japan was what he wanted.
August 18
Roosevelt to Churchill [via U.S. Embassy]
“I learned that the Japanese Ambassador had on August 16 approached the Secretary of State with a request for a resumption of the informal conversations … I replied by reviewing the Japanese Government’s action in actively pursuing a course of conquest and in inspiring the Japanese press to attack this Government … I suggested that if the Japanese Government is prepared to embark upon a peaceful program this Government would be prepared to resume the exploratory conversations …we felt that it would be helpful to have a clear statement of the Japanese Government’s attitude and plans.”
On July 2, the Imperial Conference decided to push the “southern” policy instead of “northern”. Although Germany urged Japan to invade Russia, Japanese leaders were decide to respect the neutralization pact between Russia and Japan. Japan won’t abandon the Indo-china. On August 6, Ambassador Nomura mentioned to Secretary of States Hull that Japan would refrain from stationing troops in the Southwest Pacific region and withdraw from Indo-china after the settlement of war in China. United States were asked for suspending military activities in the Southwest Pacific and restoring normal trade relations with Japan.
One day before this telegram sent, Roosevelt came back from Atlantic Conference. The main concerns of Roosevelt and Churchill were more likely about Russia and Middle East. The problem of Indochina seemed can be solved by conversations. Roosevelt hadn’t mentioned anything about a war against Japan. The tone of Roosevelt was absolutely optimistic.
October 15
Roosevelt to Churchill
“Mountbatten has been really helpful to our Navy people and he will tell you of his visit to the Fleet in Hawaii. The Jap situation is definitely worse and I think they are headed North–however, in spite of this you and I have two months of respite in the Far East…”
In September, the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill was not about Japan. Roosevelt and Churchill had mentioned about the material supply to Russia, the transportation on Atlantic or some else. On October 15, the tone of Roosevelt dramatically changed comparing to what he said on August 18.
In fact, the Imperial Conference held on September 6 mentioned about the possibility of war with United States. It was openly stated that great risks were involved, and that no sure victory. In the end, it boiled down to the argument that “there will never be a better time than now”.
The American-Japanese negotiations never stopped in September. However, some fundamental issues of United States were not satisfied, including the troops withdrawal in China. Prime Minister of Japan, Prince Fumimaro Konoe, had wanted to have a meeting with Roosevelt. He was informed that the deadline of negotiation was October 15. The officials doubted whether meeting between heads of two nations was really effective, because there were no agreements of fundamental issues between two nations. The negotiations had reached a “deadlock”. And, the movement of additional troops to Indochina had been reported. Japan was demanding more air bases and military facilities in southern Indochina.
Roosevelt used to think that Japan would have agreement with United States and turn their troops into Soviet Union. However, this time, he had been over-optimistic. He used the only time “Jap” instead of “Japan”, shown his psychological shock by Japan matters. Now, he started to think about a war between United States and Japan, which would not occur within two months. War was the worst solution in Roosevelt’s mind. It didn’t mean that war could not be avoided. Negotiation was going on. Roosevelt wanted to remain peace, and Japanese wanted to pretend to remain peace for preparation for the war.
October 20
Churchill to Roosevelt
“…the Japanese menace, which has seemed to grow so much sharper in the last few days…I still think, however, that the stronger the action of the United States towards Japan, the greater the chance of preserving peace. Should however peace be broken and the United States become at war with Japan, you may be sure that a British declaration of war upon Japan will follow within the hour. We hope to be able before Christmas to provide a considerable Battle-squadron for the Indian and Pacific Ocean.”
November 2
Churchill to Roosevelt
“…we are sending that big ship you inspected into the Indian Ocean as part of the squadron we are forming there. This ought to serve as a deterrent on Japan…The firmer your attitude and ours, the less chance of their taking the plunge.”
In response to Roosevelt’s telegram, Churchill appealed Roosevelt to give out a strong joint declaration to Japan. In addition, he indicated that Britain would always support United States. Furthermore, Churchill mentioned about reinforcing the Far East.
On October 16, Prince Fumimaro Konoe(1891-1945) resigned from Prime Minister. He was ssucceeded by Army Minister Hideki Tojo(1884-1948) on October 18. Prince Fumimaro Konoe was willing to avoid any war against United States and Britain. Unfortunately, He failed to do so. The resign of Konoe was a sign that Japan was preparing for war.
Churchill was a tough person. His well known saying is “we will never surrender”. He was more active, but not just waited for the result of negotiation. He wanted a tough, joint declaration to deter Japan. He mentioned, “I cannot feel that Japan will face the combination now forming against her of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia…Nothing would increase her hesitation more than the appearance of the force I mentioned, and above all a KGV. This might indeed be a decisive deterrent”.Therefore, two Canadian infantry companies as reinforcement arrived British Hong Kong on October 28. In addition, Capital ship Prince of Wales and Battle-cruiser Repulse sailed for Singapore.
He underestimated Japanese power. Japanese was not “barbarian” like British colonies. At least, Tojo could not be deterred. Tojo did not avoid war as a solution to settle the American-Japanese conflict.
November 5
Churchill to Roosevelt
“I have received Chiang Kai-Shek’s attached appeal addressed to us both for Air assistance...None the less I should be prepared to send pilots and even some planes if they could arrive in time…
…The Japanese have as yet taken no final decision, and the Emperor appears to be exercising restraint…our joint embargo is steadily forcing the Japanese to decisions for peace or war…
No independent action by ourselves will deter Japan…I think myself that Japan is more likely to drift into war than to plunge in.”
November 7
Roosevelt to Churchill
“We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek’s appeal is addressed…In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment…
We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind along the lines we are taking, together with continuing efforts to strengthen our defenses in the Philippines Islands, paralleled by similar efforts by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan’s hesitation, whereas in Japan’s present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might have, with as least even chance, an opposite effect…”
In these two telegrams, Churchill and Roosevelt shared different opinion coping the problem. Although Churchill had insufficient aircrafts and pilots to support Chiang Kai-shek, he had a positive attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek’s approaching. Churchill still wanted a joint Anglo-American warning toward Japan.
However, It was not favorable to Roosevelt. Tojo’s cabinet decided to continue negotiations until the absolute dead-line of November 30, but the loss of Japan’s position in China and leadership in Asia could not be accept by Japan. Whatever, The American-Japanese negotiations was still in process. Roosevelt did not want to blow the negotiation and provoke a war, especially United States haven’t finish preparation for war yet. Roosevelt continued to back away from giving any warnings to Japan, preferring to concentrate on building up American military strength in the Pacific.
November 24
Roosevelt to Churchill
“On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi.… The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products…
…the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed…
This seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly soon.”
On November 20, Japanese Ambassador was ordered to present a proposal for a modus vivendi called Proposal B among Japanese officials as a last trying at a settlement. The proposal was announced in Tojo’s cabinet on November 5. Proposal B was about both United States and Japan not to make an armed advance into South-east Asia and South-west Pacific area, restoring American-Japanese trade and petroleum supply to Japan, United States not to hinder efforts for peace by both Japan and China.
Japan did not make any concession. That meant United States may tolerate Japan’s hegemony in China. Secretary of States Hull later wrote that the things America was asked to do “were virtually a surrender”. Roosevelt, now, was pessimistic about the future of American-Japanese negotiations. “real trouble” was probably war. Roosevelt recognized the reality, and started to further preparation for war.
November 30
Churchill to Roosevelt
“one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration…that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties…I beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that “any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress…”
December 7
Churchill to Roosevelt
“The Prime Minister would be very glad of any comments which the President may have on the attached draft of the declaration to the Japanese Government.”
On December 7, Churchill finished draft the joint declaration to Japan. That was the last correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt before the attack on Pearl Harbor. On November 30, Churchill suggested a joint declaration again. He was right. It was “one important method remains unused”. And, It was the last method to avoid a war. Roosevelt finally agreed with Churchill’s suggestion on December 4 and 5. Obviously, it was not very hopeful. It was merely what Roosevelt could do at that time. Churchill was waiting Roosevelt’s comment, but the war was about to start.
Conclusion
For a long time, people’s interpretation of the attack on Pearl Harbor was that the United States had no preparation for war at all. The Correspondence of Roosevelt and Churchill has shown us this myth is partly true. On early December, both Roosevelt and Churchill realized a war against Japan was hard to avoid, but they did not know when and how would Japanese declare for a war.
Churchill was a more active person. He always encouraged Roosevelt to take a tougher position coping the problem. As a result, Roosevelt agreed with Churchill, however, it was too late. Japanese government’s attitude was constantly and increasingly aggressive. Roosevelt was not sensitive enough to detect that Japan would suddenly drift into war. It was fatal for many lives on Pearl Harbor.
沒有留言:
張貼留言